MANAGERIAL OPPORTUNISM AND FOREIGN LISTING:
SOME DIRECT EVIDENCE
AMIR N. LICHT*
1. INTRODUCrION

To what extent do private interests of managers, controlling
shareholders, and other insiders affect corporate actions and the
structure of the legal system? This Article presents evidence that
such interests (hereinafter "managerial opportunism," for brevity)
have a significant effect on both aspects in the growingly important
context of foreign listing.
Modem analyses of the corporate form invariably revolve
around the agency problem,' and "corporate governance" is
widely understood today to constitute the means for coping with
this problem. 2 Shleifer and Vishny, for instance, provide a thorough review of the theoretical and empirical literature on the relations between corporate governance and the agency problem.3 In
particular, they discuss the interplay between legal rules and
shareholding structures as alternative means for curbing adverse
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1 See Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production,Itformation Coss, and
Economic Organization,62 AML ECON. REv. 777 (1972); Michael C. Jensen & William

H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: ManagerialBehavior, Agency Costs and Ounership
Structure,3 J.FiN. EcoN. 305 (1976).
2

See Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, A Survey of CorporateGovernance,52

J. FiN. 737,738 (1997).
3 Id. ("Our perspective on corporate governance is a straightforward agency
perspective.'.
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effects of the agency problem. 4 Direct evidence as to the incidence
of the agency problem in particular situations (except for litigated
cases of self-dealing, etc.) is relatively rare, however.
A prominent manifestation of the globalization of equity markets is the growing number of foreign listings, i.e., listings of stocks
on markets outside the issuer's home country, which is usually its
country of incorporation s Academic interest in foreign listings is
growing in parallel. In an extension of this literature, scholars recently started floating the idea that companies may want to list
their stocks on foreign markets with a view to improve their corporate governance, thereby creating shareholder value.6 By doing so,
issuers could metaphorically piggyback the host country's legal infrastructure. 7 The debate over the feasibility and desirability of
this "piggybacking paradigm" may be viewed, in turn, as an offspring of the broader debate over international regulatory competition in securities regulation.8
This Article argues that such piggybacking may also have a
dark side in the sense that foreign listing transactions could be
guided, inter alia, by managerial opportunism. Elsewhere I developed such an argument more by way of intelligent speculation.9
4

See id.

See International Federation of Stock Exchanges, http://www.fibv.com/
statistics.asp (last visited Mar. 24, 2001).
6 See John C. Coffee, The Futureas History: The Prospectsfor Global Convergence
in Corporate Governance and Its Implications, 93 Nw. U. L. REV. 641, 674 (1999);
5

RONALD J. GILSON, GLOBALIZING CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: CONVERGENCE OF FORM
OR FUNCTION 26 (Columbia Law School Working Paper No. 174 & Stanford Law

School Working Paper No. 192, 2000), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3
/papers.cn?cfid=79829&cftoken=42986856&abstract.id=229517 (last visited Mar.
24, 2001); Edward Rock, Securities Regulation as Lobster Trap: A Credible Comnitment Theory of Mandatory Disclosure 10, (February 27, 2001) (unpublished
working paper, on file with author).
7 See BERNARD S. BLACK, THE LEGAL AND INDUSTRIAL PRECONDITIONS FOR
STRONG STOCK MARKETS, (Stanford Law School Working Paper No. 179, 2001),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/so3/papers.cfm?cfid=79829&cftoken=429868
56&abstract_id=182169 (last visited Mar. 24, 2001).
8 See, e.g., Roberta Romano, EmpoweringInvestors: A MarketApproadi to Securities Regulation, 107 YALE LJ. 2359 (1998) (advocating regulatory competition); Merritt B. Fox, Securities Disclosurein a Globalizing Market: Who Should Regulate hom,
95 MICH. L REV. 2498 (1997) (critiquing unmitigated competition); Stephen J. Choi
& Andrew T. Guzman, The DangerousExtraterritorialityof American Securities Law,
17 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 207 (1996) (advocating regulatory competition).
9 See Amir N. Licht, Genie in a Bottle? Assessing ManagerialOpportunism in InternationalSecurities Transactions,2000 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 51.
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This Article contributes to the literature by providing evidence for

such an effect from an Israeli regulatory program aimed to lure Israeli issuers listed only on U.S. markets to list their stocks also on
the Tel Aviv Stock Exchange ("TASE"). This is a particularly interesting case because U.S. listing by Israeli issuers is often brought as
an example for corporate governance-improving piggybacking 0
and because Israel is the second largest supplier of foreign stocks
to U.S. markets, after Canada. In contrast, this Article argues-in a
paraphrase on Brandeis' timeless maxim 1 -that foreign listing
may sometimes help insiders and control persons to avoid the
disinfecting sunlight of their home country securities law.
This case study provides a rare opportunity to isolate the alleged effect of managerial opportunism since it enables us to hold
constant most of the regularly cited motivations for foreign listing.
From the vantage point of most Israeli-U.S.-listed issuers, the differences between the domestic United States and Israeli securities
regulation regimes and the United States regime for foreign issuers, to which they are already subject, refer to corporate governance issues. The staunch resistance from the Israeli business and
financial sectors to any additional disclosure of this type is consistent with managerial reluctance to become subject to a more exacting corporate governance framework. The lessons this Article
draws from this case study can inform policy makers in every
country, however. Beyond the immediate context of foreign listing, this Article also contributes to the path dependence branch of
the corporate governance literature in presenting evidence consistent with rent seeking and locked control models.12
The Article proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews the managerial motivations for foreign listing. Section 3 describes the regulatory menu facing Israeli issuers in Israel and the United States.
10 See Asher Blass et al., Corporate Governancein an Emerging Market The Case
of Israel, 10 BANK Ai. J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 79 (1998); Coffee, sipra note 6, at 675;
Rock, Securities Regulation as Lobster Trap, slpra note 6, at 1.
11 See Louis D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY AND How THE BANMS USE
IT 92 (1914).

12 See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Mark J. Roe, A Theory of Path Dependencein Ccrparate Ownership and Governmce, 52 STAN. L REv. 127 (1999); Lucian Arye Bebchu,
A Rent-Protection Theory of Corporate Ownership and Control (Nat'l Bureau of
Econ. Research Working Paper No. W7203, 1999), availableat http://papers.ssrn.
(last
com/so3/papers.cfn?cfid=79829&cftoken=42986856&abstract_id=203110
visited Mar. 24,2001).
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Section 4 provides a brief timeline of the dual listing project. Section 5 then discusses the conclusions that emerge from this case
study. Section 6 concludes.
2. MANAGERIAL MOTIVATIONS FOR FOREIGN LISTING

Listing on a foreign stock market in order to credibly commit to
a better legal regime is but one of several different motivations for
making a foreign (single) or dual listing. Financial motivations are
by far the more important reasons among them.' 3 Motivations in
this rubric revolve around realizing international diversification
and segmentation gains and increasing the stock's liquidity.' 4 As a
result, firms can lower the expected return on equity and thus
broaden the scope of feasible business projects. Another category
of motivations includes other business goals, foremost among
which is the desire to increase the issuer's visibility in the capital
and product markets.' 5 Multinational and would-be multinational
corporations also use foreign listing to establish an image of truly
international firms'16
Until recently, little attention has been paid to the role managerial opportunism may be playing in the decisions companies face
regarding whether to make a foreign listing and the choice of particular destination markets. Most of the existing studies are largely
oblivious to the problem, but this is now changing. For instance,
Huddart et al. argue that stock exchanges competing for trading
volume will engage in a "race for the top" whereunder disclosure
requirements increase and trading costs fall.' 7 They base their entire model on a managerial opportunism assumption by examining
13

See Licht, Genie in a Bottle?, supra note 9, at 71-75.

14 See, e.g., Yakov Amihud & Haim Mendelson, Liquidity and Asset Prices: FinancialManagement Implications,17 FIN. MGMT. 5 (1988) (discussing liquidity gains

in general); Vihang Errunza et al., Can the Gainsfrom InternationalDiversification be
Achieved without TradingAbroad?, 54 J. FiN. 2075 (1999) (discussing diversification
gains).
15 See H. Kent Baker, Why U.S. Companies List on the London, Frankftrtand Tokyo Stock Exchanges, 6 J. INTL SEC. MARKm 219, 221 (1992); H. Kent Baker et al,
International Cross-Listing and Visibility 5-9 (Working Paper, 1998), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/so13/papers.cfm?cfid=211807&cftoken=17422233&abstrc
tid=142287 (last visited Mar. 24,2001).
16 See Licht, Genie in a Bottle?, supra note 9, at 79-83.
17 Steven Huddart et al., Disclosure Requirements and Stock Exchange Listing
Choicein an InternationalContext, 26 J. AcCT. & EcoN. 237 (1999).
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"how public disclosure requirements affect listing decisions by
rent-seeking corporate insiders."s In the spirit of the piggybacking
paradigm, Fuerst argues that a stricter regulatory regime would
allow firms to credibly convey information about their future
prospects.19 Fuerst accounts for managerial opportunism by modeling the adverse effects a stricter regime may have on managers
due to increased exposure to securities litigation. 20 Blass and Yafeh
argue that Israeli high-quality innovative firms list in the United
States to distinguish themselves from firms that issue stock back
home.21
Elsewhere I reviewed the theoretical and empirical literature on
the motivations for foreign listing and argued that company decision-makers are expected not to remain agnostic to legal duties
pertaining to them individually.22 In certain situations, the effect
on the agent could be significant while the effect on public shareholders is negligible-what Lucian Bebchuk has dubbed "significantly redistributive" issues.23 Examples of such issues include
regulation of affiliated party transactions, disclosure of top executive remuneration on an individual basis, and opportunities to engage in insider trading with impunity.24
Although there exists evidence that the timing of (domestic)
listing is affected by managerial interests,2 3 arguments about
managerial opportunism in foreign listing are inherently difficult
to test empirically. This is due to several reasons. First, numerous
motivations are likely to be at play simultaneously.2 6 Analyses
based on stock price behavior can usually reflect only the aggreIs Id. at 237.
19 See OREN FuErsT, A THEoRETICAL ANALSis OF THE INVESTOR PROTECION

REGULATION ARGUMENT FOR GLOBAL LISTING OF STOCKS 3 (Int'l Center for Fin, at
Yale, Working Paper, 1998), available at http://papers.ss.com/so3/paperscfm

?cfid=79941&cftoken=34507821&abstract.id=139599 (last visited Mar. 24,2001).
20 See id

n See Asher Blass & Yishay Yafeb, Vagabond Shoes Longing to Stray. My Foreign Firms List in the United States, 25 J. BANKING & FIN. 555 (2001).
22 See Licht, Genie in a Bottle?, suipra note 9, at 88-104.
23 See Lucian A. Bebchuk, Federalism and the Corporation:The Desirable Limits

on State Competition in CorporateLaw, 105 HARv.L REV. 1437,1461 (1992).
24 See id,
at 1461-67.
25 See Gwendolyn P. Webb, Evidence ofManagerialTiming: The Caseof Ecdrmige
Listings, 22 J. FIN. RES. 247 (1999).
26 See Licht, Genie in a Bottle?, stitranote 9, at 70-71.
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gate effect of the transaction. 27 In most cases, one would expect the
positive effect resulting from financial and business reasons to
override the potentially adverse effect of managerialism. Studies
that tried to determine the level of informed trading following a
28
foreign listing came up with conflicting findings.

Second, the research methodologies employed so far have been
unsuitable for answering this question. In questionnaire-based
surveys like Baker's 29 or Fanto and Karmel's,3o which are otherwise
informative as to corporate motivations, it would be practically
impossible to gauge the role of management's own interests. By
necessity, such questionnaires are addressed to top executives who
are unlikely to openly state that they were motivated by personal
interests. 3 ' If they did, they would immediately expose themselves
to personal lawsuits. Similarly, one cannot really expect to find as
a stated rationale, for example, to restore management's peace of
mind or to enable corporate executives more easily to trade on in32
side information, in a study like Chaplinsky and Ramchand's,
that analyzed global offering disclosure statements.
Third, a research methodology like Saudagaran and Biddle'sp3
which constructed disclosure level rankings in various ways, also
cannot isolate those few disclosure items that may have a strong
personal influence on corporate decision makers because they are
only a small subset of the general disclosure regime. If a certain
disclosure regime, in its entirety, is more burdensome than another
(which is probably often the case), the particular effect of the personally-related items may be lost.
Finally, there exists a problem of selection bias: all the empirical studies cover companies that actually decided on and com27

See id. at 85.

See Amir N. Licht, Regulatory Arbitrage for Real: International Securities
Regulation in a World of InteractingSecurities Markets, 38 VA. J. INT' L. 563, 599-601
28

(1998).
29

Baker, supra note 15, at 226; Baker et al., supra note 15, at 25-26.

30 See James A. Fanto & Roberta S. Karmel, A Report on the Attitudes of Foreign
CompaniesRegarding a U.S. Listing, 3 STAN. J. L. Bus. & FIN. 51 (1997).
31 See, e.g., id at 61 (discussing methods to obtain data from executives).
32 See Susan Chaplinsky & Latha Ramchand, The Rationale for Global Equity
Offerings (1996) (unpublished working paper, on file with author).
33 See Shahrokh M. Saudagaran & Gary C Biddle, Foreign Listing Location: A
Study of MNCs and Stock Exchanges in Eight Countries, 26 J. INT'L Bus. STUD. 319
(1995).
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pleted a foreign listing.34 "They did not (and could not) cover all
the companies whose management ever considered, but refrained
from, effecting a foreign listing."3 5
3. THE REGULATORY MENU FOR ISRAELI ISSUERS
Under traditional legal conventions, the legal regime governing
a publicly traded company is a composite of the company law of
its country of incorporation, the securities laws of all the countries
where it is listed, and the listing rules of all the markets it is listed

on. 6 In a global economy with free flow of equity capital, Israeli
entrepreneurs can incorporate under numerous national laws and

companies can list their stock on dozens of stock exchanges. Israeli
issuers' preferred jurisdiction for foreign listing is the United
States, although several issuers are also listed on European markets. 3 7 We can therefore limit the analysis of the regulatory menu

facing potential issuers to the components included in Israeli and
U.S. laws.
3.1. ShareholdingStructures
As a backdrop for the legal menu, a note is in place with regard
to typical Israeli shareholding structures. While U.S. and British
public corporations tend to be widely-held, their Israeli counterparts tend to exhibit a European-like ownership structure. 3 The

34

35

See Licht, Genie in a Bottle?, supra note 9, at 103.
Id. Using a matched control sample would not solve this problem because

such a sample needs to comprise companies that considered a foreign listing but
rejected it altogether or a particular destination market.
36 The fundamental factor that engenders such composite legal regimes is the
distinction between corporate law as private law and securities regulation as public law. In common law countries, the corporate law governing a country is the
law of its country of incorporation, which has personal applicability. See
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIoNs LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 213

(1987) (hereinafter RESTATFmE)
("For purposes of international law', a corporation has the nationality of the state under the laws of which the corporation is organized."). Securities regulation, however, applies territorially. For a discussion
of this legal complex, see Licht, Regulatory Arbitragefor Real, supra note 28, at 617-

21.
37 See Telephone Interview with Kobbi Avramov, Head of Research Department, Tel-Aviv Stock Exchange (une 7,2000).
3s See generally Rafael La Porta et al., Corporate Owner-sip Around the World, 54
J. FIN. 471, 498-500 (1999) (providing information about various ownership structures).
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vast majority of issuers listed on the TASE have a controlling
shareholder, which is either a family or the state.39 While Israeli
securities law effectively prevents diversion from one-share-onevote capitalization, use of pyramids is rife, and a large part of
TASE-listed companies are controlled by a handful of family40
controlled groups.

Israeli issuers listed on U.S. markets are a mixed bag in terms
of their shareholding structure as well as their size.41 Several Israeli issuers boast market capitalization in the billions of U.S. dollars, but there are also many medium and small size issuers. 42
Many, but definitely not all, of these companies are "new economy" firms that operate in hi-tech areas and have U.S. venture
capital ("VC")funds among their major shareholders.43 The more
technology-oriented, VC-funded companies tend to have a larger
portion of their equity capital publicly held compared with TASElisted companies. 44 Even these companies, however, still have
controlling shareholders and are not truly widely held.45
3.2. Company Law

As of mid-2000, practically all Israeli publicly traded companies were incorporated under the Companies Ordinance, 1929,
which was copied from the English Companies Act, 1929.46 Notwithstanding its old historical roots, legislative amendments it had
undergone, and an extensive gloss added by courts' decision law
allowed the Ordinance to provide robust foundations for a mod39 See id. at 500-0Z
40

See Kobi Avramov & Yuval Zuk, Control Groups of Publicly Traded Compa-

nies, 214 HAHODESH BABUtSA (Stock Exchange Monthly) 3 (1999).
41 The following details are culled from various sources as there is no official
or public body that publishes data on these issuers. For an excellent review, see
Edward B. Rock, Greenhorns, Yankees, and Cosmopolitans: Venture Capital,IPOs, Foreign Finns and U.S. Markets, 3 THEORETICAL INQuRIEs L.(forthcoming 2001).
42 For updated data, see http://analyst.co.il/anl/StockPoint/ (last visited
Apr. 1, 2001) (listing issuers in Hebrew).
43 See Rock, Greenhorns,supra note 41, at 4.
44 See id. at 10, and informal discussions with Edward Rock
45 See Rock, Greenhorns,supra note 41, at 14 and informal discussions with Ed
Rock
46 See Shomo Guberman, The Development of the Law in Israel: The First 50
Years, available at http://www.israel.org/mfa/go.asp?MFAHOOylO (last visited
Mar. 24,2001).
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em, well-functioning company law. For the present purposes, suffice it to say that to a large extent, Israeli law looks very much like
English or U.S. corporate law. It establishes similar governance institutions and imposes fiduciary duties of loyalty and care on directors, officers, and controlling parties.47 Israeli merger law is
relatively underdeveloped due to the paucity of merger transactions. On the other hand, both statutory and decision law are more
stringent with regard to affiliated parties than U.S. law.4S Affiliated
or interested party transactions were subject to special disclosure
duties and non-interested approval procedures. 49
Effective February 2000, the Companies Law, 5759-1999 replaced much of the old Ordinance.5 0 This is a modem piece of legislation, which adopted advanced corporate governance mechanisms, e.g., a tender offer regulatory regime designed after a model
advanced by Bebchuk. 51 Except for a few issues, however, the new
Law did not radically change the content of Israeli company law.
Its treatment of insiders and controlling parties is somewhat more
exacting, perhaps, than under the Ordinance.
It should be noted that starting in the late 1990s, Israeli entrepreneurs began incorporating under the Delaware General Corporation Law. 2 This trend is gaining momentum.s3 Different sources
have estimated that during the years 1999-2000, around ninety percent of new start-up companies were incorporated outside of Is-

47 See, e.g., Companies Law 5759-1999, §§ 252-54 (Aryeh Greenfield, A.G.
Publications trans., June 1999) (providing duties of care and loyalty).
4s For instance, Israeli Law sets forth elaborate procedures for approving
transactions between public corporations and affiliated parties. See Compnies
Law 5759-1999, §§ 270-75 (Aryeh Greenfield, A.G. Publications trans., June 1999).
For a review of the law under the Ordinance, see Zohar Goshen, ControllingCorpo-

rate Agency Costs: A United States-Israel: Comparative View, 6 CARDoZO J. ITL &
ComP. L 99 (1998).
49 See id. at 109-10.
50 Companies Law 5759-1999 (Aryeh Greenfield, A.G. Publications trans.,
June 1999).
51 See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk, Toward Undistorted Clioice and Equal Treatment
in CorporateTakeovers, 98 HARV. L REv. 1695 (1985).
52 See Yaakov Scheinin & Yossi Hollander, The Macro Picture: Working Paper
Toward the Conference "Israel's Future Industries" at The Israel Democracy In-

stitute, Tel Aviv 13 (May 26, 2000) (unpublished working paper, on file with
author).
53 See id.

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014

U. Pa. J. Int'l Econ. L.

[22:2

rael, mostly in the United States. 4 Among the reasons mentioned
for this trend are burdensome tax implications for corporate transactions and restrictions on controlling shareholders under the new
Companies Law. ss
3.3. Securities Regulation
Israeli securities regulation is based on the Securities Law,
5728-1968 and regulations thereunder 5 6 The regime is based on
Anglo-American concepts and specific rules, which, at bottom,
make it quite similar to the securities regulation regime under the
United States Securities Acts. Both legislative and decision laws
impose extensive disclosure duties, prohibit manipulation, fraud,
and insider trading, and rely on U.S. legal concepts like materiality.57 Israeli law differs from U.S. federal law in that it sometimes
proscribes duties that in the United States are found in stock exchange listing rules, e.g., immediate disclosure of material events.5 8
Israeli issuers that opt for listing on a U.S. national market become subject to the regulatory regime applicable to foreign private
issuers 9 and can report using Form 20-F.60 This U.S. foreign issuer

54 See Itamar Levin, Doron Kohav CPA: The Number of Hi-Tech Companies IncorporatingOverseasInstead of in Israel Has Doubled, GLOBES, Jan. 3, 2001; Scheinin &
Hollander, supra note 52, at 12.
55 See Stella Korin-Lieber, Just Like in America, GLOBES, Feb. 20-21, 2000.
56 Securities Law 5728-1968 (Aryeh Greenfield, A.G. Publications trans., April
2000).
57 See, e.g., C.A_ 3520/90 Baranowitz v. Securities Authority, 46(2) P.D. 818
(applying materiality test to disclosure duty); Crim. A. 4675/97 Rozow v. State of
Israel (not yet published) (applying materiality test to insider trading).
58 See Securities Regulations (periodical and intermediate reports), 5740-1970,
§ 36.
59 The term "foreign private issuer" is defined in Rule 3b-4(c) under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 17 C.F.R. § 240.3b-4 (2000). This status is granted to
entities incorporated outside the United States unless more than half of the corporation's shareholders are located in the United States, and the entity's principal
business activities are located in the United States. The definition was amended
in September 2000, inter alia, with regard to determining the location of shareholders. Thanks to Howell Jackson for these details.
60 In September 2000, the SEC adopted a complete revision of Form 20-F in
order to align it with the international disclosure standards of the International
Organization of Securities Commissions ("IOSCO"). This is not a relaxation of the
disclosure requirements applicable to foreign issuers, however, and the key financial statement requirements have not changed. See EDWARD F. GREENE E"AL., U.S.
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regime differs from the regime applicable to domestic (U.S.) issuers
in several significant points, as detailed below. The crucial point is
that similar differences exist in comparison with the Israeli regime.
The most significant differences concern disclosure of conflict
of interests. Form 20-F permits foreign private issuers to disclose
aggregate remuneration and aggregate options to purchase securities, unless the issuer discloses these data for individually named
directors and officers. 61 Foreign issuers are further exempted from
disclosing data concerning material transactions with officers, directors, and control persons, unless the issuer makes such disclosure.62 According to Loss and Seligman's authoritative treatise,
"[t]hese requirements significantly compromise the more demanding conflict of interest requirements found in Items 402 to 404
or Regulation S-K."63
Form 20-F requires foreign issuers to disclose the names of persons known to them as owning more than ten percent of the issuer's voting securities and the total amount of voting securities
owned by the officers and directors as a group, without naming
them. 64 In contrast, the threshold for U.S. (and Israeli) issuers is
five percent, and issuers must disclose individual holdings of their
officers and directors. 65
While foreign issuers' financial statements must be substantially similar to those filed by domestic issuers, the former can, in
certain circumstances, avoid the requirement to disclose business
segment information. 66 Lowenstein, among others, considers this

REGULATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL SECURITIES AND DERIVATIVES MARKETS

SAI-1-2

(5th ed. 2000).
Note that by incorporating under U.S. corporate law, Israeli entrepreneurs
lose the option to list as a foreign private issuer, so there is a trade-off between an
arguably more lenient corporate law and a stricter securities regulation regime.
61 Form 20-F, 5 Fed. Sec. L Rep. (CCH) 29,701 (1993).
62
63
64
65

See id.
See Louis Loss & JOEL SEUGMAN, 2 SEcuRrEs REGULATION 769 (1991).
Form 20-F, 5 Fed. Sec. L Rep. (CCH) 29,701 (1993).
See 17 CF.R. §229.403(a) (2000) (providing American issuers); Securities

Regulations (Periodical and Intermediate Reports), 5740-1970, § 24 (providing Israeli issuers).
66

Loss & SEUGMAN, supra note 63, at 769.
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duty an important corporate governance tool and identifies additional accounting-related issues with a similar effect.67
Rule 3a-12 68 exempts foreign private issuers from several duties
with regard to proxy statements under Section 14 of the Exchange
Act. As a result, the sensitive voting mechanism of these issuers,
inasmuch as proxies are involved, is not subject to the same disclosure regime that applies to domestic U.S. issuers.
Rule 3a-12 further exempts foreign private issuers from Section
16 of the Exchange Act, namely, from the prohibition on short sales
and short-swing profits by corporate insiders. 69 While these insiders remain subject to disclosure duties regarding their shareholdings under Section 13 and to the general anti-fraud prohibition under Rule 10b-5,70 the exemption from Section 16's short-swing sales
prohibition does allow them more room to trade on insider information.
Finally, foreign issuers using Form 20-F can file an annual report within six months after the end of the fiscal year covered,
while domestic issuers must include financial statements that are
within 135 days of the filing date.71
4. THE DUAL LISTING PROJECT
4.1. The Roots

The roots of the dual listing project go back to 1983, when the
TASE was closed down for three weeks in the wake of the worst
financial crash in Israel's history. 72 In 1993, the market started to
gather steam again, but in 1994 it was hit by another crash.73 With
public confidence completely lost, the market became dormant until 1999. Consequently, the fast growing high technology sector
was unable to tap the TASE for the funds it needed during the
67 See Louis Lowenstein, FinancialTransparency and CorporateGovernance: You
ManageWhat You Measure,96 COLUM L. REv. 1335,1346 (1996).
68 17 C.F.R § 240.3a-12-3(b) (2000).
69 17 C.F.R. § 240.3a-12-3 (2000).
70 17 C.F.R § 240.10b-5 (2000).
71 Form 20-F, 5 Fed. Sec. L Rep. (CCH) 29,701 (1993).
72 See MARSHALL SARNAT Er AL, THE STOCK EXCHANGE AND THE INVESTMENT IN
SEcuRITIEs41-45 (Marshall Sarnat &June Dilevsky, eds., 2d. ed. 1999).

73 Id.
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1990s. As a VC industry was also largely undeveloped at that time,
start-up companies began seeking funding in the United States.
With the United States just coming out of a recession, the timing
was perfect, and, with Silicon Valley VC fund managers on their
boards, the road to NASDAQ was the natural one to take 4
It seems that in the mid-1990s, TASE officials realized that if
they continued losing this business, they would lose "the entire
shop." In response, they started floating the idea of a fast track

dual listing of U.S.-listed Israeli companies7 -what later came to
be called "automatic dual listing." The dual listed firms were supposed to jump start the local market and provide the necessary
volume for maintaining the local financial sector alive.7 6
4.2. The Brodett Committee
In February 1998, a new Israel Securities Authority ("ISA")
Chairwoman nominated an expert committee (the "Brodett Committee") to examine whether exemptions should be given to dual
listing of securities that are already listed overseas 7 7 The Committee narrowed down its analysis to the national U.S. markets, in
light of their dominance, as the destination for Israeli foreign listings.78 It compared in detail the legal and accounting regimes under Israeli law with those applicable to foreign issuers under U.S.
federal securities law and markets' listing rules. 9 The Committee
also surveyed managers of seventy U.S.-listed Israeli firms and received twenty-five responses.8 0
Although the Brodett Committee was authorized to "examine
possibilities," its working assumption was that the situation was
anomalous, unacceptable, and likely to lead to irreversible harm to
IsraeYs high-tech sector and capital markets The Committee thus
adopted the TASE's analysis that things must be changed, and
74

Rock, Greenhorns,supra note 41, at 10-15.

See Merav Arlozorov, TASE: Dual Listing Will Contribtie at Least Another
US$IOOM to Trading Volumes, GLOBS, Jan. 8-9,1997.
76 See id.
77 See ISRAEL SEcURrrIES AUrHORrrY, CO, rrEE REPORT ON DUAL LISTING OF
SECURrrIES 3 (1998) [hereinafter BRODErT REPORT].
78 See id.
at 4.
75

79 See id.at 30, app. 9.
90 See id.app. 3.
81 See id-at 7.
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quickly.82 The Committee further expressed hope that bringing
"higher league" players to the local market would improve market
discipline.
The Committee Report is based on several noteworthy findings:
1. The legal and accounting regime applicable to American issuers-based primarily on Form 10-K periodical disclosure
under the Exchange Act-is substantially equivalent to the
Israeli one in terms of the investor protection it provides
and therefore can be relied on for regulating dual listed securities.8 3

2. In contrast, the U.S. regime applicable to foreign issuersbased primarily on Form 20-F-is inferior to the Israeli regime and the Form 10-K regime.84
3. Israeli issuers in the United States use Form 20-F, but most
of them supplement their reports with voluntary, 10-K-like
disclosure of business data.85
4. Surveyed officers ranked the following subjects as requiring relaxation of the Israeli disclosure regime:
a) Special disclosure requirements in a prospectus. 86
b) Timing of business results disclosure.
c) Immediate reporting of pending negotiations.
d) Disclosure about transactions with interested and controlling parties.
e) Disclosure about private placements of securities.
The Committee strongly recommended adopting a special dual
listing arrangement for securities listed on national U.S. markets.87
It rejected, however, the idea of relying on issuers' Form 20-F reports, notwithstanding the few voluntary supplements. 88 Instead,
82

See iiL at 14.

83

See BRODErT

REPORT supra note

77, at 25, app. 8.

See id. at 21.
See id.
86 These requirements include specification of main clients, product segmentation, benefits to interested parties, and names of main shareholders. Note, however, that these requirements are largely identical to public offerings by U.S. issuers registered under Section 5 of the Securities Act and using Form S-1
thereunder.
87 See BRODEIT REPORT, supra note 77, at 15.
84
85

88 See iL at 21.
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it recommended to require issuers to upgrade their reporting to the
more demanding regime applicable to U.S. issuers. 9 The Committee opined that only the latter standard is suitable for investor
protection in Israel and would prevent discrimination against local
issuers. 90
4.3. Implementation
When the Report was released in September 1998, its recommendations were pioneering in terms of the regulatory paradigm
they reflected, namely, the unilateral recognition of a foreign securities regulation regime.91 Notwithstanding an initial warm welcome, the industry was not truly happy with the recommendations, as they did not call for automatic dual listing.9 2 As the
implementation of recommendations got repeatedly delayed, the
ISA came under growing attacks from the TASE on the one hand,
speaking on behalf of the financial sector, and from the Public
Companies Association ("PCA") on the other, representing the issuers.93 Anytdng short of automatic dual listing, they argued in
public and private fora, would render the project stillbom.94 Their
main concern was the additional disclosure duties dealing with
interested and controlling parties.9 i
To complicate things further, the new Companies Law was to
go into effect in February 2000 and foreign-listed Israeli companies
demanded to be exempted from duties they were not subject to
heretofore.9 6 Industry representatives argued during discussions
in the Knesset (the Israeli parliament) that the foreign laws are suf89 See id.

9) See id. at 25.
91 In July 1999, Belgium surpassed Israel in adopting such a regulatory strategy, intending to assist NASDAQ in its competition with other European stock
markets. For a review and analysis of the Belgian project, see Amir N. Licht, Stock
Exchange Mobility, Unilateral Recognition, and the Privatizationof Sectrities Regulation, 41 VA. J. INr'L L (forthcoming 2001).
92 See Yoram Gavison, Bronfeld: Viability of Capital Market is in Dmiger without
Approval of Dual Listing,HAARErTz, Dec. 31,1999.
93 See id.
94 See id.
95 See Motti Bassok, Public Companies Association: Without Drastic Change in
CapitalMarket Hi-Tedi Companies Will Flee Israel, HAAREFZ, Feb. 2, 2000; Gavison,
supra note 92; Stella Korin-Lieber, Doing Us a Favor, GLOBE, Nov. 30-Dec. 1,1999.
96 Committee Discussion in the Knesset, minutes not publicly available.
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ficient for protecting Israeli public shareholders9 7 They also complained that the new law is generally hostile to controlling shareholders and would drive them to incorporate in Delawaresomething that had already begun. 98
The confrontation reached its peak in mid-February 2000, under the shadow of intensifying competition to the TASE.99 In a
meeting called by the Minister of Finance, Mr. Brodett reversed his
position and sided with the TASE and the PCA's demand for
automatic dual listing100 The Minister ordered "maximum relaxation" in drafting the dual listing law.101 The ISA read the writing
on the wall and backed away from its original requirement of 10-Klike periodical reporting. At that point, people at the ISA were
willing to accept 20-F-based reporting but still insisted on disclosure regarding interested parties. Continuing pressure from the
TASE and prominent business persons forced the ISA to cave in in
this respect also. Independently, but related to the dual listing
project, the ISA promoted other legislative reforms generally applicable to all issuers. 10 2 Their effect was to iron out several differences between the Israeli and U.S. securities laws.

97

Id.

98 See Levin, supra note 54; Scheinin & Hollander, supra note 542, at 12.

99 At that time, NASDAQ's Chairman visited Israel and it was announced
that NASDAQ intends to open an extension in Tel Aviv. Earlier that year,
NASDAQ announced its plan to start trading in four leading NASDAQ-listed Israeli securities. The immediate threat to the TASE was evident. See, e.g., Boaz
Levi, CapitalHas No Passport,HAARETZ, Feb. 16, 2000 (illustrating that future capital markets will not be bound by national borders); Keren Zuriel & Zeev Klein,
Tightening Connections between NASDAQ and IsraeliCompanies Listed on it to be Examined, GLOBES, Feb. 12-13, 2000 (announcing the plans of the Israeli Prime Minister and the head of NASDAQ to tighten the relationship between the NASDAQ,
TASE, and Israeli firms listed on the NASDAQ).
100 See Merav Arlozorov, David Brodett Changed His Mind, HAAR-Z, Feb. 15,
2000; Korin-Lieber, supra note 55.
101 See Korin-Lieber, supra note 55.
102 These issues included abolishing disclosure of pending negotiations, exemption from prospectus in employee securities offerings, exemptions and relaxation regarding interested parties transactions, etc. See Securities Law 57281968, amend. 20 (Aryeh Greenfield, A.G. Publications trans., April 2000); Companies Regulations (Relaxations regarding Transactions with Interested Parties),
5760-2000. Special further exemptions were made to foreign listed companies in
order to prevent putting them under conflicting requirements that stem from Israeli company law on the one hand and foreign securities laws on the other hand.
See Companies Regulations, 5760-2000.
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In July 2000, the Knesset adopted an agreed amendment that
allows Israeli issuers listed on national U.S. markets to list their
stocks on the TASE based entirely on disclosures they make overseas under U.S. law or voluntarily.103 The ISA retains its regulatory
jurisdiction over such issuers to request additional information, 104
but it is understood that this authority is reserved for exceptional
circumstances. Necessary regulations were adopted in October
2000 and by early 2001, eight companies had already been listed on
the TASE under the new arrangement 05
5. DiscussioN
The case of the Israeli dual listing project provides a rare opportunity to isolate as much as possible the effect of managerial
interests on the foreign listing decision, on corporate decisionmaking in general, and on the content of corporate governance
rules. This is because the factual context of the project is unique in
comparison with the numerous cross-sectional studies of foreign
listings and even company-specific case studies, e.g., of DaimlerBenz's listing on the NYSE.106 While in most cases making a foreign listing is one giant leap for the issuer, the kind of dual listing
envisaged for the project should not be more than one small step.
Managerial interests feature highly among the factors that affect
taking this step.
As a general matter, making a foreign listing entails considerable transaction costs. The primary market transaction of the listing itself is costly,107 and on-going disclosure is also costly when-

103 See Securities Law 5760-2000, amend. 21 (Aryeh Greenfield, A.G. Publications trans., 2000).
104 See Securities Law 5728-1968, as amended, §35.24 (Aryeh Greenfield, A.G.
Publications trans., 2000).
105 See Yoram Gavinson, Paradigm - Eigith Dual Listed Company, HArErz,
Feb. 14,2001.
106 See Dennis E.Logue & James K Seward, C0allenges to Corporate Governance:Anatomy Of a GovernanceTransformation: The Case of Daimler-Benz, 62 Law &

Cowri.

PRoi3s. 87 (1999); see also Lee H1 Radebaugh et a., Foreign Stock Eidrange

Listings:A Case Study of Daimler-Benz, 6 J. INr'L FIN. MG r. & Accr. 158 (1995).
107 See Howell Jackson & Eric Pan, Regulatory Competition in International
Securities Markets- Evidence from Europe in 1999 3 (June 9, 2000) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with author) (surveying costs of alternative primary market
transactions).
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foreign market. The putative benefits of the foreign listing hopefully compensate for these additional costs. What makes the present case unique is the fact that for U.S.-listed Israeli issuers, these
costs are mostly sunk costs, because these issuers had already paid
for underwriting, accounting, and legal services, and had already
adjusted to reporting under the foreign regime.
Suppose, arguendo, that dual listing on the TASE would have
zero benefits for the issuer. This is a very unrealistic assumption:
the TASE now has a modem trading system, which allows it to
charge highly competitive trading fees. It operates in a different
time zone, 08 and clearance and settlement of trades on it are completed on a T+1 basis. 09 Finally, in most U.S.-listed Israeli issuers
the vast majority of employees are Israeli residents, a great deal
(often a majority) of shareholders are Israelis, and oftentimes-especially in non-high-tech issuers-their customer base is also
largely Israeli.1 0 As a result, dual listing on the TASE is likely to
increase liquidity and have a positive effect on share value.
To be sure, absent a special arrangement, listing on the TASE
would entail costs associated with complying with the Israeli disclosure regime since such listing would be deemed a public offering or security. Indeed, such listing could be just as "foreign,"
even for a U.S.-isted Israeli issuer, as it would have to bear substantial compliance costs in order to prepare financial statements in
Hebrew and according to Israeli GAAP. The dual listing project
was supposed to eliminate these costs by permitting issuers to use

108 Cf.Ian Domowitz et al., International Cross-Listingand Order Flow Migration: Evidence from an EmergingMarket, 53 J. FIN. 2001, 2002-03 (1998) (noting, however, that despite the difference in time zone, the trading hours overlap within an
hour of those of the United States market).
109 See TASE, http://www.tase.co.il/html2/pub/clearing/p.introd.htm (describing the TASE clearing house) (last visited Mar. 24, 2001).
110 It is difficult to know the national identity or other details with regard to
shareholders who hold less than ten percent of the issuer's voting shares. See
Form 20-F, 5 Fed. Sec. L Rep. (CCH) 29,701 (1993). The text therefore reflects
common knowledge among Israeli's market professionals. For indirect evidence,
see Rock, Greenhorns,supra note 41, tbl.5 (providing details about principal shareholders in large U.S. listed Israeli issuers); Ronit Harel Ben-Zeev, Activity in Israeli
Stocks in the U.S. in 1998, 210 HAHODESH BABURSA [STOCK EXCHANGE MONTHLY] 3

(1999) (arguing that trading activity in most U.S.-listed Israeli stocks is low or medium because American institutional investors are not attracted to them).
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their U.S. disclosure documents as a basis for compliance with Israeli securities regulation."'
Recall that the Brodett Committee originally recommended
that dual listed issuers be required to enhance their reporting from
a 20-F-based to a 10-K-like regime.112 To assess the compliance cost
implications of this recommendation it is useful to distinguish
between three categories of disclosure subjects: financial disclosure (comprising mainly of financial statements), business disclosure (regarding, e.g., competition and line-of-business), and corporate governance disclosure. As regards financial disclosure, both
the Committee and the ISA found that most U.S.-listed Israeli issuers already comply, voluntarily, with the majority of disclosure
items required under Form 10-K but not under Form 20-F.113 Enhancing current disclosure with additional financial information
would not significantly change the regulatory burden borne by
dual listed companies. A similar outcome would obtain with regard to other business-related disclosure. As a result of the aforementioned reform in Israeli securities law, listing on the TASE
would not have created difficulties in terms of disclosing pending
negotiations, summary business results, etc.
The last category is corporate governance disclosure, and the
picture here is fundamentally different. As already mentioned,
U.S. general securities law calls for several disclosure items that go
to the root of the agency problem but are not required under the
U.S. foreign issuer regime." 4 Israeli securities law includes substantially the same requirements." 5 For this reason, the Brodett
Committee believed that complying with Form 10-K could satisfy
the legislative purpose of investor protection as interpreted by Is111 See supra Section 4.2
112 See BRODErr REPORT, supra note 77, at 21.
113 These items include a description of dependence on a particular client or
group of clients, updated aggregate orders for current and previous years, and
identification of activity markets and competitors, when material. Israeli issuers
reporting under Israeli GAAP also happen to provide line-of-business disclosure,
which is indirectly called for under Form 20-F. A disclosure item required under
Form 10-K but not under Form 20-F, which is not regularly disclosed by Israeli
issuers, is a reporting of sales by product breakdown. See Letter from Tal Even-

Zahav, Israel Securities Authority, to Amir Licht (June 7, 2000) (on file with
author).
114 See supra Section 3.3.
115 See supra Sections 3.2, 3.3.
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raeli law while not imposing excessive compliance costs due to Israeli formalities."16 The TASE and issuer representatives, however,
staunchly and vocally resisted even an iota of additional disclosure
and eventually prevailed." 7
The developments in the dual listing project thus suggest that
managerial interests probably played a significant role in forming
the final version of the Israeli amendment, which adopted a watered-down dual listing regime." 8 This interpretation is consistent
with path dependence models that are based on rent seeking and
locked control structures.119 Before concluding that this indeed
was the case, consider two possible counter-arguments.
First, the initiative for a dual listing exemption and the continuing pressure towards the project's completion came primarily
from the TASE, with the PCA generally taking the back seat. One
could thus argue that competition between stock exchanges has led
to the final legal outcome. This is a correct, but inconclusive, argument. Stock exchanges that vie for listings need to persuade
management to choose them. To succeed, they are likely to internalize managerial interests if they thought that such interests
would be decisive. The reluctance of stock exchanges in the United
States in the late 1980s to agree on a one-share-one-vote rule provides a vivid example for stock exchanges guided by managerial
interests.120 Indeed, when the SEC promulgated Rule 19c-4, which
would have prevented dual class common stock recapitalization, it
was the Business Roundtable-a business interest group-that

12
challenged the Rule in court and led to its annulment. '
Second, one could argue that disclosure requirements under
both the U.S. and the Israeli laws are excessive and that institutional investors-who are the dominant players in today's equity

116

117

See BRODErr REPORT, supra note 77, at 25.
See supraSection 4.3.

118 See BRODETT REPORT, supra note 77, app. 3.
119 See Bebchuk, supra note 12; Bebchuk & Roe, supra note 12.
120 See, e.g., Marcel Kahan, Some Problems with Stock Exchange-Based Securities
Regulation:A Comment on Mahoney, The Exchange as Regulator, 83 VA. L. REv. 1509,
1514-18 (1997) (arguing that exchanges designing and regulating securities regulations are subject to incentive and enforcement problems).
121 Business Roundtable v. SEC, 905 F.2d 406 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
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markets2 2 -could have demanded such corporate governance disclosure. The fact that Israeli issuers make voluntary business disclosure would thus indicate that they respond to market demand
for information, when such demand exists. This argument too is
inconclusive, however. To begin, it is subject to the objection that
corporate governance disclosure is a "significantly redistributive
issue"1 23 and thus unlikely to be set optimally by market forces.
More importantly, there may be positive value to government
regulation of financial markets compared with contractual commitments. 124 Evidence indeed shows that institutional investors
are interested in regulating disclosure of this sort. Recall that
Regulation S-K (but not Form 20-F) requires individual disclosure
of remuneration and option plans for top corporate directors and
officers.12 5 Recently, the International Corporate Governance Network, an international body of institutional investors, adopted an
"enhanced" version of the OECD's Principles of Corporate Govemance,1 26 in which it calls for disclosure of remuneration break-

down of individual directors and top executives.127
Until February 2000, Israeli regulations under the Securities
Law allowed issuers to disclose remuneration information on an
aggregated basis, but a 1992 amendment to the old Companies Ordinance required publicly traded corporations to provide an individual remuneration breakdown. 2 8 The new Companies Law,
however, does not have a parallel provision, such that by February

122 See Michael Bradley et al., The PtrposesandAccountability of the Corporation
in Contemporary Society: CorporateGoveniance at a Crossroads,62 LAw & CoNrTFiA.
PROBS. 9,18 (1999).
123 See Bebchuk, sipranote 23, at 1461.
124 See Rafael La Porta et al., liwestor Protectionmd Corporate Gozenance, 53 J.
FIN. EcoN. 3,21 (2000).
125 See supra notes 63-68 and accompanying text.
126

See ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION

("OECD"), OECD

AND

DEVELOPMENT

OECD Doc.
SG/CG(99)5 2 (1999), available at http://www.oecd.org/daf/governance/
principles.htm (last visited Feb. 22,2001).
PRINCIPLES

OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE,

127 See INTERNATIONAL CORPORATE GOVERNANCE NETWORK, STATEMENT ON

GLOBAL CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PRINCIPLES, July 9, 1999 at 7, available at

http://wv.thecorporatelibrary.com/docs/globalcorpgov.htm (last visited Feb.
22,2001).
12s CoiPANIES ORDINANCE, § 123A (1983) (providing the official translation of
the British 1929 Ordinance).
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2000, Israel could have been left without regulation of this issue.
Davis Global Advisors, Inc., an institutional investor consulting
firm specializing in comparative corporate governance, voiced
concern about this possibility. 129 After the ISA was informed of
these concems, 130 it moved quickly to introduce into the Securities
Regulations language similar to that used in the about-to-expire
Ordinance. Davis Global responded with satisfaction.131
To recap, from the vantage point of most Israeli U.S.-listed issuers, corporate governance disclosure is the main difference between the domestic U.S. (and Israeli) regime and the foreign issuer
regime to which they are already subject. The staunch resistance
from the business and financial sectors to any additional disclosure
is consistent with, and is probably due to, managerial reluctance to
become subject to a more exacting corporate governance framework. By listing and remaining listed, only in the American market officers and controlling persons of Israeli issuers were able to
take advantage of its more lenient disclosure regime. As we have
seen, this leniency of the foreign issuer disclosure regime is not benign and is commonly interpreted as inferiority. In the regulatory
competition literature the debate is simplistically cast in terms of a
"race for the top" versus a "race for the bottom." In this framework, making a foreign listing in the U.S. is considered as piggybacking on a superior regulatory system, namely, "a piggyback

race for the

top."1 3 2

As this article shows, however, the case of Is-

raeli issuers provides evidence consistent with the contrary conjecture. If there was any piggybacking going on in this case, then it
was for the bottom.
129 See Secret Pay Ballot, GLOBAL PROXY WATCH, Jan. 21, 2000, at 1; Letter from
Stephen Davis, Davis Global Advisors, to Amir Licht (anuary 17, 2000) (on file
with author).
130 Letter from Amir Licht to Miri Katz, ISA Chairperson (an. 25, 2000) (on
file with author).
131 See Eleventh Hour, GLOBAL PROXY WATCH, Feb. 4, 2000, at 2. An odd outcome of this development is that Israeli issuers now do not need to provide individual remuneration disclosure because the Securities Law and regulations thereunder apply territorially while the Companies Ordinance had personal,
international application. It must be noted, however, that U.S.-listed Israeli issuers used to ignore the provisions of the Ordinance that were directed to publicly
traded companies on the (wrong) assumption that they apply only to TASE-listed
issuers.

132 See supra text accompanying notes 6-8.
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6. CoNCLUSION

The present study contributes to several currently open debates. The story of the dual listing project adds to the body of evidence suggesting that managerial opportunism is a significant
factor in decision-making processes in public corporations. In particular, this study provides evidence directly relevant to the growing phenomenon of foreign listing. This study also sheds light on
the role managerial opportunism plays in legislative processes of
corporate governance-related rules. With this said, one must not
conclude that managers are only interested in taking advantage of
public shareholders, nor that foreign listings are necessarily fraud
schemes in disguise, nor that corporate governance must be heavily regulated under a single international umbrella. Such interpretations would be caricatures of the arguments advanced here.
More than anything else, this study attests to the need for more
empirical evidence on these important issues.
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